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Abstract—The Internet of Things (IoT) propagates the
paradigm of interconnecting billions of heterogeneous devices by
various manufacturers. To enable IoT applications, the commu-
nication between IoT devices follows specifications defined by
standard developing organizations. In this paper, we present a
case study that investigates disclosed insecurities of the popular
IoT standard ZigBee, and derive general lessons about security
economics in IoT standardization efforts. We discuss the motiva-
tion of IoT standardization efforts that are primarily driven from
an economic perspective, in which large investments in security
are not considered necessary since the consumers do not reward
them. Success at the market is achieved by being quick-to-market,
providing functional features and offering easy integration for
complementors. Nevertheless, manufacturers should not only
consider economic reasons but also see their responsibility to
protect humans and technological infrastructures from being
threatened by insecure IoT products. In this context, we propose
a number of recommendations to strengthen the security design
in future IoT standardization efforts, ranging from the definition
of a precise security model to the enforcement of an update policy.
I. Introduction
Standardization efforts play a major role in the expansion of
the Internet of Things (IoT) as the success of the IoT is driven
by interconnecting a multitude of devices, possibly produced
by various manufacturers. This requires manufacturers to agree
on common communication protocols at network and applica-
tion level. Such standardization efforts are mainly fostered by
standard developing organizations (SDOs). In the last years, a
number of open and market-driven IoT standardization efforts
aimed for market dominance. In the domain of smart home
applications, one of the market leaders is the ZigBee standard,
maintained by the ZigBee Alliance, a global non-profit SDO.
In this paper, we consider the ZigBee specifications as a case
study to derive lessons about security economics in market-
driven IoT standardization efforts. We chose ZigBee since a
number of security weaknesses have been recently revealed in
its specifications, and discuss how these weaknesses resulted
from design choices made during the standardization process.
To define a suitable security architecture, it is impor-
tant to understand the motivations of both sides, security
researchers and manufacturers, because former research [1],
[2] has concluded that the academic research community has
different priorities in securing technologies than the vendors
and consumers. In fact, the economic perspective is often not
considered in the security research. Using the lessons from
the insecurities of ZigBee as an example, the main goal of
this paper is to raise the understanding on both sides in order
to strengthen the security of future IoT standardization efforts.
Our contributions are the following: We are the first that
analyze root causes that led to the insufficient security ar-
chitecture of a popular ZigBee application standard. Learning
from the security trade-offs made in these IoT specifications,
we provide recommendations on how to strengthen security
architectures in future IoT standardization efforts. Our results
show that the majority of the revealed attacks, which ultimately
allow the complete take-over of the target devices, could have
been prevented if particular compromises in the security design
would have been avoided. We hope that the lessons learned
from these security pitfalls raise the attention of manufacturers
and SDOs to improve the methodology in defining security
measures in future IoT products. Also, our goal is that the
research community gains a deeper understanding about the
economic priorities in IoT standardization efforts.
II. Background on ZigBee
ZigBee is an IoT mesh network and application stan-
dard maintained by the ZigBee Alliance. Popular IoT ap-
plications that implement the ZigBee standard include smart
home products and smart meters. The ZigBee Alliance is
a non-profit SDO and consists of more than 400 member
companies [3]. The first ZigBee specifications were released
in 2004. In the early years, the approach of the ZigBee
Alliance was to bundle application-specific functionality in
separate specifications, denoted as application profiles, to meet
the needs of particular applications, e.g., connected lighting
systems. This approach led to problems of interoperability
between smart home products that should cooperate in a joint
network but implement different application profiles. The latest
specifications, ZigBee 3.0, which were publicly released in
2016, aim to unify these profiles into one universal standard.
In this work, we focus on the ZigBee Light Link specifications
for connected lighting. Although these specifications itself are
deprecated since 2016, major parts of them are inherited to
ZigBee 3.0.
In ZigBee, each personal area network (PAN) has its own
network key that is shared among all nodes of this network.
Implementers of products that follow the ZigBee Light Link
specifications can choose between two commissioning pro-
cedures to obtain the network key: either classical commis-
sioning or touchlink commissioning. Classical commissioning
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is suitable if the network is commissioned using a mobile
device application and a bridge device. In contrast, touchlink
commissioning, which was specifically designed for the needs
of connected lighting systems, is utilized for managing a
network using a constrained device, such as a remote control.
However, a number of security weaknesses have been
revealed in both commissioning modes. Zillner and Strobl [4]
demonstrated insecurities in the classical commissioning as
they exposed that ZigBee-certified products can be forced
to encrypt the network key for the over-the-air transmission
using a publicly known fallback key. Also, they showed that
ZigBee-certified products can be easily reset by sending an
unauthenticated reset-to-factory request.
In our previous work [5], we analyzed the security of the
touchlink commissioning procedure. We showed that this com-
missioning procedure is insecure by design, allowing attackers
to trigger the identify action (e.g., blinking) of ZigBee-certified
devices for several hours, and to change their wireless channel
(and thus permanently disconnect nodes from their legitimate
network) without knowing any key material. In addition, an
attacker can passively eavesdrop the network key and take full
control over devices since the master key, which protects the
network key during the over-the-air transport, was leaked [6].
We demonstrated these vulnerabilities by evaluating popular
ZigBee-certified connected lighting systems.
In ZigBee 3.0, the mechanisms of the classical commis-
sioning procedure merged with novel features, such as link
keys derived from an install code that is printed on the product,
into the so-called ‘EZ-mode’ commissioning. EZ-mode is only
activated for a short period of time after pushing a button on the
product. Thus, the attacks demonstrated by Zillner and Strobl
[4] are mainly contained. Also, the ZigBee 3.0 specifications
inherited the touchlink commissioning procedure from the
ZigBee Light Link specifications with just small adjustments
but without replacing the leaked key. Thus, the threats shown
in our previous work [5] also affect all products certified for
ZigBee 3.0 that enable the optional touchlink commissioning.
III. Root Cause Analysis
The security research community has a different perspec-
tive on securing IoT technologies than manufacturers since the
economic perspective is often not taken into account. In this
section, we outline priorities and incentives of market-driven
standardization efforts and then analyze what went wrong in
the standardization of the ZigBee Light Link specifications.1
A. Motivation for Standardization
Several analyses (e.g., [7], [8], [9]) outline motivations
of manufacturers to participate in strategic alliances, which
promote the standardization of novel technologies.
A first reason for participation is to decrease market
uncertainties since the risks are shared among all participat-
ing companies [10], [8]. For the innovator, standardization
increases the probability that the own technology succeeds,
1The authors are not associated with the ZigBee Alliance. The information
presented in this case study were obtained by discussions with officials and
members of the ZigBee Alliance, publicly accessible information including
specifications, and technical inspections of ZigBee-certified products.
and it prevents other alliance members from developing com-
petitive (proprietary) systems. In the case of the ZigBee Light
Link specifications that define a network and application
standard for connected lighting, the ZigBee Alliance started
the development of the standard in 2010, with contributions
from Philips, Osram, and GE, among others. The ZigBee
Light Link technology became a large success since another
organization, The Connected Lighting Alliance (TCLA), a non-
profit organization promoting the compatibility of wireless
lighting, endorsed this standard in July 2013 after studying
multiple open standards.
A second reason is that members of standardization pro-
cesses profit from strategic knowledge transfer among alliance
members [11]. Since multiple manufacturers contribute their
know-how to the standardization efforts, alliance members
benefit from knowledge spillover, as well as keep track over
technical knowledge of their potential competitors [12]. Ac-
cording to the ZigBee Alliance, the contribution of intellectual
property to their standards by member companies is very
common. As an example of knowledge transfer, the touchlink
commissioning procedure, intellectual property of Philips [13],
was contributed to the ZigBee Light Link specifications.
Access to new markets is a third reason for participation
in standardization efforts. Alliances provide low entry levels
for entering foreign markets, i.e., markets that have not been
entered by a manufacturer yet [9]. Also making own products
compatible to complementary products opens new markets,
even for small companies. The ZigBee Light Link standard
was developed because members of the ZigBee Alliance saw
a promising market. Afterwards, further companies that did not
participate in the development of these specifications, offered
products that complement ZigBee-certified lighting systems,
e.g., wireless dimmer switches [14].
To bear the expenses of the organizational overhead of
such a strategic alliance, their members are obligated to pay
an annual fee. Usually, SDOs offer several levels of mem-
bership that differ in the amount of fee and privileges: the
more financial resources a member contributes to the alliance,
the more influence this member has on the alliance’s final
decisions. In case of the ZigBee Alliance, three membership
levels are offered: adopter ($4k/year), participant ($9.9k/year),
and promoter ($55k/year) [15]. While adopters have access to
all final specifications and some group events, only participants
and promoters can participate in work groups and propose
specifications. Of them, only promoters have the right to finally
approve new specifications.
B. ZigBee as Case Study on Security Economics
From the economic perspective [1], [2], if a standard
is aiming for market dominance, then this standard must
attract manufacturers of complementary products as well as
consumers. These prioritized efforts take much resources, and
since resources are finite, they tend to be withdrawn from
non-functional features, e.g., comprehensive security measures.
At the end, a large amount of resources is spent to develop
an attractive system but only a few resources are left to
make it secure. In fact, security measures may even make it
harder for complementors to build complementary products
that support this standard. Therefore, in the first phase of
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an evolving technology, manufacturers tend to ignore security
as they expand their market position. Consumers reward
manufacturers for adding functional features to products and
being first at the market. On the contrary, the development of
an adequate security architecture for these products requires
time-consuming testing and might restrict favored functional
features. In a latter phase, security measures may be added to
lock consumers to the products. These two phases can be seen
in the ZigBee Light Link standard.
Phase 1 – Security Design Trade-Offs: The ZigBee spec-
ifications prior to ZigBee 3.0 distinguished between home
consumer and business applications. In the case of connected
lighting systems, the ZigBee Light Link standard was in-
tended to serve the home consumer market, while another
ZigBee application profile, the ZigBee Building Automation
standard [16], provides functionality for connected lighting
systems in business and industrial settings. The significant
differences between these two standards can be found in their
security architectures. While ZigBee Building Automation fol-
lows the ZigBee Pro specifications and offers the full classical
commissioning procedure that uses a dedicated device, called
Trust Center, for key management [17, p.432], the ZigBee
Light Link standard aimed to decrease the complexity of
the commissioning in order to increase consumer acceptance.
Thus, the classical commissioning procedure in the ZigBee
Light Link standard lacks the Trust Center and relies on a
global non-disclosure agreement (NDA)-protected master key.
Attacks against the classical commissioning procedure are
known. These attacks exploit fallback mechanisms that are in
place to compensate the lack of the Trust Center [4]. Security
weaknesses were also found in the second commissioning
mode, the touchlink commissioning procedure. Touchlink com-
missioning uses the inter-PAN transmission mechanism to join
a new device to an existing network, one of the most security-
critical operations in ZigBee networks including the transport
of the network key to the joining device. The concept of
inter-PAN frames was adopted from the then already existing
ZigBee Smart Energy specifications, a profile targeting smart
metering applications. The ZigBee Smart Energy specifications
define the purpose of inter-PAN transmissions as possibility
for ZigBee devices to ‘perform limited, insecure, and possibly
anonymous exchange of information’ [18, p.81]. An exemplary
application utilizes this transmission mechanism for the ‘mar-
ket requirement to send pricing information to very low cost
devices’, e.g., a refrigerator magnet that displays the current
energy prices and consumption. The ZigBee Light Link spec-
ifications adopted these inter-PAN transmission mechanism
to enable the commissioning of networks with constrained
devices. Intended use cases are, e.g., a bulb that should be
joined to an existing network using a simple remote control.
The adoption of these unauthenticated inter-PAN transmissions
to reduce the complexity of commissioning procedures, in
combination with the usage of signal strength as physical
security measure, resulted in the insecurities presented in [5].
Another critical point is the trust in the safe-keeping of
master keys that are shared among multiple manufacturers.
Both commissioning procedures of the ZigBee Light Link
standard rely on an NDA-protected shared key used to encrypt
the network key. Although the distributed security global link
key (also known as ZLL link key), used for the classical
commissioning (and its successor in ZigBee 3.0: EZ-mode
commissioning), is not leaked yet, this can happen anytime.
NDA-protected keys can indeed leak as demonstrated by the
touchlink preconfigured link key (also known as ZLL master
key), which was leaked in March 2015 on Twitter [6].
All these security weaknesses, resulting from over-
simplified (thus insecure) commissioning procedures including
master keys and fallback mechanisms, show that trade-offs
have been made at the expenses of a comprehensive security
architecture to allow other manufacturers to adopt to this
standard easily. At the same time, ZigBee-certified products
implementing the more secure ZigBee Building Automation
standard have not been released yet. The separation between
home consumer and business applications has been discon-
tinued in ZigBee 3.0, while the touchlink commissioning
procedure is still an optional feature in ZigBee 3.0.
Phase 2 – Lock the Consumers: In December 2015, Philips
(as one of the driving forces behind the ZigBee Light Link
standard) assumingly tried to lock consumers more tightly to
its products. This happened with an update of the Hue app,
which locked out products from other vendors like Osram
and GE that are not participating in the ‘Friends of Hue’
certification program. The public sentiment was large such
that Philips reverted this decision after a few days through
providing a non-scheduled update [19]. Although Philips did
not disclose the mechanism how the lock-out was technically
implemented, this mechanism can be seen as a security feature
that restricts access to the network for white-listed devices.
Consumers’ Difficulties with Assessing Security: As de-
scribed in the economic theory of ‘the market for lemons’ [20],
consumers are unwilling to pay for something they cannot
assess, such as security [1]. The ZigBee specifications define
security measures that are partly very ineffective. But how
can a regular consumer determine which level of security is
provided by an IoT product? The security of the ZigBee spec-
ifications seem solid at first sight as the specifications apply
the well-known encryption and authentication scheme AES-
CCM. Assuming a shared network key, an attacker without
knowledge of this key is not able to decrypt or manipulate
AES-CCM-encrypted messages. Nevertheless, as shown in [4],
[21], [5], an attacker is able to gain full control of ZigBee-
certified products.
IV. Implications of Insecure IoT Products
So far, it seems that the development of strong security
measures in IoT products mainly leads to competitive disad-
vantages. From an economic perspective, large investments in
security are not necessary as the consumers do not reward
them. High priorities are being quick-to-market, providing
functional features and offering easy integration for comple-
mentors. One might assume that investments in security saves
money in the long run: Through security breaches, people
would lose their trust in the manufacturer and the companies’
reputation decreases. But experiences from the past show that
many companies, which have been affected by trust-losing
data breaches, do not go out of the business, although they
may suffer significant short-term consequences [22], [23], [24],
[25]. For example, security flaws in connected lighting systems
(see [4], [21], [5], [26], [27], [28]) have been disclosed almost
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since the release of these products but none of them really
affected the attraction in this technology or its vendors. From
the economic perspective of the manufacturers, there are less
benefits in strongly securing IoT devices compared to the
benefits that arise from shorter development cycles omitting
these security measures. From our point of view, this might
change in the future, when people start suing manufacturers
of insecure IoT products for financial compensation, or gov-
ernmental regulations demand comprehensive security levels
for market entry.
Irrespective of the current situation, we state that manufac-
turers should take into account ethical considerations and act
responsibly. Consumers can be indeed harmed through the in-
securities of IoT systems, even by connected lighting systems.
Blackouts or unintended blinking of lights may not only annoy
but also frighten residents. Epileptic seizures can be caused
by flickering lights on epilepsy patients [29], [30]. Insecure
IoT systems have been used for large denial-of-service attacks
against critical infrastructures [31], [32]. Researchers showed
that even a single infected light bulb has the potential to serve
as incubator to spread malware on IoT systems across large
areas [21]. All these threats might endanger humans as well
as infrastructure. If manufacturers deny their responsibility to
protect against such threats, which clearly result from security
weaknesses in their products, they might become subjects to
class action lawsuits. Recently, there have been several class
action lawsuits against manufacturers that acted irresponsi-
bly. Volkswagen settled a class action lawsuit on its diesel
emissions cheating scandal by paying compensations of 14.7
billion USD [33]. Samsung faced class action lawsuits for the
slow replacement of its fire-prone mobile phone model [34].
In another class action lawsuit, Ford is alleged of knowingly
releasing a flawed infotainment system [35]. These lawsuits
have high economic impacts on manufacturers and could have
been avoided by taking responsibility seriously.
V. A Road to Improvement
We propose five recommendations to strengthen the
security design of future IoT standardization efforts.
A. Define Precise Security Models
During our research, we realized that most specifications
of IoT standards do not define a precise security model. The
objective of the security model is to formulate against what
threats an IoT system should be protected (‘security goals’)
and who are the potential attackers (‘attacker model’ or ‘threat
model’). In fact, this model formulates the goals of the security
design, and therefore, should also be part of the specification.
Based on the security model, the security architecture should
be developed that considers potential threats comprehensively.
Such an architecture provides a significantly smaller attack
surface than security architectures designed by experience
(or best practices) but without assessing the specific threat
conditions of this application. As V. D. Gligor said referring
to security models for wireless ad-hoc networks: “A system
without an adversary definition cannot possibly be insecure;
it can only be astonishing, and of course astonishment is a
much underrated security vice” [36]. Exemplary, we reviewed
the ZigBee Light Link specifications [37], the ZigBee 3.0 base
device behavior and cluster library specifications [38], [39], but
also the LoRaWAN [40] and the Bluetooth 5.0 specifications
[41] regarding security models. These IoT-related standards are
widely supported by large alliances and their specifications are
released to the public. All these standards lack the definitions
of an attacker model as well as the security goals. Although
this recommendation demands more extensive periods of stan-
dard development cycles, the process of developing a security
model can be designed in a generic way, such that the resulting
model can be adopted to different applications with small
effort. The development of the ZigBee Light Link standard
took more than two years. Compared to this period of time, the
discussion and definition of a comprehensive security model
should not increase this duration significantly.
B. Stop Consumer and Business Security Differentiation
As described in Section III, some SDOs tend to distinguish
between home consumer and business products. In the ZigBee
Light Link standard, the security of home consumer products is
based on a weaker security architecture than business products
of the comparable ZigBee Building Automation standard. If
we compare the volume of sold products, then more IoT
home consumer products than business IoT products are sold.
Gartner predicted the installation of around 7 billion consumer
IoT devices compared to 4.2 billion business IoT devices in
2018 [42]. Thus, a security breach of a popular IoT home
consumer products would affect millions of devices. However,
there is no straight line between consumer and business prod-
ucts in IoT technologies. Although the Philips Hue system is
intended for home consumer use, it can also be deployed in an
industrial context, e.g., to control workflows [43]. Since many
IoT systems offer interfaces for third-party applications, the
implementation of consumer products in industrial processes
is a simple and inexpensive option. In the case of connected
lighting systems based on ZigBee Light Link, another reason
might be that there exists no business product (based on
the ZigBee Building Automation standard) that offers similar
functionalities and flexibility to the best of our knowledge.
Thus, we state that the IoT demands high security standards
for both, consumer and business products.
C. Add Membership Level for Academic Institutes
We counted the contribution of academic researchers to
popular IoT-related standards and assessed exemplary the IoT
standards mentioned in Section V-A. In none of these specifi-
cations, academic institutes are listed as contributors, except
Bluetooth 5.0 states contributions by the University of Bonn
(and NIST). Manufacturers have extensive experience in the
aspects of functionality and the needs of the market, which are
very important insights. Moreover, we assume that they employ
experienced security engineers. However, corporate security
engineers might be too much aware of the business goal trade-
offs involved in the security design. This conflict of interest
may make it difficult for them to insist upon meeting strong
security goals. Therefore, an outside view of the academic
researchers can help in two ways: (1) to better appraise the
probabilities of attacks and consequences of insecure design
and (2) to integrate innovative research solutions into the
security design. To achieve academic participation, SDOs
should lower the barriers for contribution, e.g., by introducing
a membership level for (selected) academic institutes that
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allows (and potentially pays) academic experts to participate in
work groups. While fostering academic participation requires
investments in selecting and hiring academic experts, the
opportunity of knowledge spillover from academic research
can be a valuable enrichment to standardization efforts.
D. Conduct Security Testing Without Conflict of Interest
During the final certification process of the product, not
only the functionality of the product should be tested for com-
pliance. Also the implementation of the security architecture
in software and hardware should be evaluated with code audits
and security-focused penetration tests by external certification
labs. Certain attacks [21], [5] on connected lighting systems
exploited implementation bugs that could have been avoided
through external security testing. However, security testing has
potential points of failure: Previous investigations [44], [45]
showed that vendors often prefer testing and certification labs
that perform a relaxed evaluation. Also, testing labs might lose
customers if they are too strict and delay the release of prod-
ucts since their competitors might be more easygoing. Thus,
mechanisms must be in place that precisely define the scope
of evaluation, the exact testing procedures, and punishment for
certification labs that fail to fulfill these requirements. To put
the SDO in charge of supervising the certification labs leads
to a conflict of interest. The SDO’s economic interest is to
bring products fast to the market to gain market dominance,
which corrupts the motivation for a comprehensive and time-
consuming security testing. Therefore, an independent entity
that is not influenced by economic motivations must be in
charge to supervise the certification labs. The conduction of
these security penetration tests will most likely increase costs
and demands more extensive periods of product development
cycles but finally also reduces the probability of expensive
replacement and patching of installed devices.
E. Define and Enforce Update Policy
During the standardization process, not only security mech-
anisms against currently known attacks should be considered
but also the possibility of upgrading security mechanisms in
case novel attacks are disclosed, implementation bugs are
discovered, or more efficient security measures have been
found. While most current IoT standardization efforts consider
update mechanisms, an update policy is usually not defined by
the SDO. The update policy defines under what circumstances
a product needs to be updated and within which time frame.
In addition, this policy should define who takes responsibility
for updates if the vendor is not able to deliver them anymore.
If such an update policy is in place (and executed), then the
security of the IoT application should be ensured for its full
lifetime. The problem of such an update policy is the enforce-
ment: what should be the motivation of the manufacturer to
update its legacy products? From the economic perspective,
why should companies invest money if there is no profit? Thus,
the motivation must be extrinsic. A regulatory paradigm shift
might be necessary such that only lifetime security-providing
vendors gain access to the markets. For instance, manufacturers
that fail to fulfill their duties in terms of providing updates for
their products would not be allowed to receive the certification
for the release of new products. The SDO cannot be trusted
with the enforcement of such an update policy due to its
conflict of interest. Hence, an independent entity, which is not
driven by economic motivations, is required to enforce this
policy.
VI. Related Work
Research on security economics in IoT and standardization
gained little attention so far. In terms of distributed systems,
Anderson and Fuloria [46] investigated the security economics
of electricity metering. Murdoch et al. [44] analyzed reasons
why certified products fail to fulfill standardized security
requirements. Leva¨ et al. [47] proposed a framework to analyze
the economic feasibility of protocols during standard develop-
ment. Ray et al. [48] outlined trade-offs between energy and
security constraints in the IoT ecosystem. Leverett et al. [45]
described problems and opportunities regarding the standard-
ization and certifications of IoT applications in terms of safety,
security, and privacy. Focusing on the European Union, they
proposed to establish institutional resources for regulators and
policy-makers. In contrast to our approach, Leverett et al.
proposed actions at state-level, while our work investigates
the security economics of IoT standardization efforts in the
private sector. To the best of our knowledge, we are the
first that investigate root causes of insecurities in a specific
IoT standard. Learning from them, we deduct lessons about
security economics in IoT standards and recommend principles
to improve the outcome of future IoT standardization efforts.
VII. Conclusion
In the past years, security weaknesses were disclosed in
ZigBee specifications, one of the most popular IoT standards
in the domain of smart homes: from leaked master keys and
fallback mechanisms to unauthenticated command messages.
Similar flaws are not only specific to ZigBee but also in other
IoT standards, e.g., Bluetooth Low Energy [49]. Learning from
the security pitfalls of the ZigBee specifications, we analyzed
the root causes for these insecurities and found them in the
prioritization of market aspects over a comprehensive security
design. More focus on designing security measures during IoT
standardization efforts is needed to protect against the rising
threats that result from billions of interconnected IoT devices.
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